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PRACTICE TRANSFER IN MNES AS THE SOCIALLY  
EMBEDDED TRANSLATION OF PRACTICES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose - With a few exceptions the mainstream literature on learning in MNEs has shown 
little concern for the transformational nature and the social constitution of learning. We 
address this gab by drawing on Scandinavian institutionalism, social learning perspectives and 
comparative institutionalism. 
Design/methodology/approach – A comparative case study was conducted of two 
subsidiaries of the same MNE. The subsidiaries received similar practices from HQ but 
displayed contrasting learning outcomes. 
Findings – It is shown that learning outcomes differed based on the varying extent to which 
practices were translated, which depends on the participation of local actors. The difference in 
participation pattern in turn is rooted in differences in the institutional context of the two 
subsidiaries. 
Research limitations/implications – It is recognized that apart from institutional influences, 
organizational idiosyncrasies may be at work. In addition, we briefly address the question to 
what extent the notion of contrasting in forms of capitalism is still useful when comparing the 
German and British institutional context. 
Practical implications – The findings highlight the importance of involving employees in the 
translation of new practices. A challenge for MNEs is that learning of new practices can differ 
by institutional context. Where enabling institutional conditions are absent, conscious effort 
may be needed to ensure employee participation. 
Originality/value – This paper highlights that MNE practice transfer rests on the translation 
of the practice content to the local context, and that subsidiary-level learning processes may 
be institutionally embedded thus establishing a link between subsidiary learning and the 
macro-level context. As such, this paper both illustrates the value of social learning 
perspectives and highlights the relevance of the work of institutionalists for understanding 
MNE learning processes. 
Keywords - knowledge transfer; multinational; subsidiary learning; social learning theory; 
Scandinavian and comparative institutionalism  
Paper type Case study 
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1. Introduction 
With a few exceptions the mainstream body of literature on learning in MNEs has shown little 
concern for the transformational nature and the social constitution of learning (e.g. Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Hansen, 2002; Schulz, 2003). Instead, successful learning is generally 
perceived as a flow of knowledge, that is, as the more or less successful absorption of 
predefined kinds of knowledge (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006). Similarly, the process of learning 
is typically understood as knowledge transferred across industries and countries in a form that 
is detached from the wider social networks that contribute to firm survival and effective 
performance (e.g. Zahra et al., 2000). This dominant view — where learning refers to a 
process of shifting discrete best practices — is a structuralist one (Macharzina et al., 2001; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2003) which results from the literature’s bias towards cognitive 
‘knowledge oriented’ perspectives (Hong et al., 2006a, 2006b) and information theory’s 
sender-receiver model of information exchange (Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009; Carlile, 
2004).  
This has lent weak attention to the transformational nature and social embeddedness of 
learning processes in MNEs. Cognitive perspectives for instance, with their focus on 
‘knowledge’ instead of learning processes, “tend to regard organizational learning as 
acquisition, storage and transmission of collective knowledge” (Hong et al., 2006a). This not 
only deemphasizes the transformation of meanings and practices in learning processes, but it 
also ignores their social constitution. By the same token, the dominant sender-receiver model 
focuses on how complex organizational characteristics of MNEs, the characteristics of the 
knowledge transferred, and the knowledge-related characteristics of sending and receiving 
subunits impact knowledge flows in MNEs. But only scant attention is devoted to how sub-
organizational processes and the social context constitute learning at the micro- and macro-
level. 
 Drawing on Scandinavian institutionalism (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) and social 
perspectives of learning (Elkjaer, 2005) and comparative institutionalism (Whitley, 2007), we 
argue that successful organizational learning depends on socially embedded translation work 
of participating actors who are enabled and constrained by their situatedness in host 
institutional settings. In this view, practice transfer will only lead to learning—that is, desired 
changes of local practices—if the transferred practices are translated by actors embedded in a 
specific social context. Translation work is necessary because it facilitates the integration of 
practices into a new social context. At the same time, local actors must be both empowered 
and enabled by their social context to participate. Only under such conditions will local actors 
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be able to relate to the transferred practices, engage in and perceive them as their own and 
subsequently institutionalize them. In other words, much in contrast to the mainstream 
perception of knowledge transfer in IB, it is argued here that only those units with a social 
context that is accommodating of local actors’ participation in new forms of organizing and 
provide operational flexibility for translation of practices will be successful learners.  
Drawing on two subsidiaries of the same MNE, we discuss two contrasting cases of 
learning within the context of a centrally initiated practice transfer. While both subsidiaries 
share similar roles in the MNE and have to adopt the same practices, they differ markedly in 
their learning patterns, that is, in terms of translating practices to the new social context. 
Specifically, while the German site features comprehensive translations of the transferred 
practices, the British site reflects much less translation effort. We show here that this 
difference in translation work is linked to different institutional conditions that shape different 
organizational conditions in terms of participation patterns at the two sites. We also 
demonstrate why the initiative dies down in one subsidiary and why it is sustained locally in 
the other case.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, section 2, we review the 
dominant view of learning in the IB literature. Following this discussion, we present an 
alternative framework of learning in MNEs, drawing on Scandinavian institutionalism, social 
learning perspectives and comparative institutionalism. In section 3 we present our research 
methodology and introduce our cases. Drawing on the analytical framework, we compare our 
empirical cases in section 4 and explain their different learning patterns. In section 5 we 
discuss the institutional embeddedness of the different organizational conditions found in the 
two case studies. In the final section, we summarize our findings and highlight our 
contribution to the literatures on IB and institutionalism.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
The dominant conceptualization of learning within MNEs is what Noorderhaven and Harzing 
(2009) term the sender-receiver model (e.g. Szulanski, 1996; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). 
Derived from information and communication theory (Carlile, 2004), the sender-receiver 
model suggests that knowledge flows are enabled and constrained by (1) the sending unit, (2) 
the receiving unit,  (3) the transmission channel, (4) the transfer message, and (5) the 
transmission context (Szulanski, 2000). Specifically, within the context of knowledge flows in 
MNEs, literature based on the sender-receiver model has particularly looked at: (1) The 
characteristics of the sending unit – such as motivation and knowledge stock (Szulanski, 
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1996; Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000); (2) The characteristics of the 
receiving unit – most notably its motivational conditions and ‘absorptive capacity’ (Szulanski, 
1996; Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Minbaeva et al., 2003; Tsai, 
2001); (3) The characteristics of transmission channels or the intra-organizational context 
such as network or relationships in the MNE – based on structural configurations as well as 
communication, coordination- and control mechanisms (Szulanski, 1996; Almeida and Phene, 
2004; Björkman et al., 2004; Foss and Pedersen 2002; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Hansen, 1999, 2002; Hansen and Lovas, 2004; Teigland et al., 2001; Tsai, 2001); (4) The 
characteristics of the transferred knowledge (Szulanski, 1996; Foss and Pedersen 2002; 
Hakanson and Nobel, 2000; Hansen, 1999, 2002; Kotabe et al., 2003; Schulz, 2003) — 
frequently based on the classical distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge — as well 
as the similarity or complementarily of  knowledge exchanged between units (Hansen 2002; 
Zanfei, 2000; Sölvell and Zander, 1995; Almeida and Phene, 2004); (5) The characteristics of 
a unit’s business and technological environment and external/local network relations 
(Almeida and Phene, 2004; Forsgren et al., 1999; Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Frost, 2001; 
Mudambi, 2002; Pearce and Papanastassiou, 1999; Kotabe et al., 2003; Yamin and Otto, 
2004).  
Thus, the sender-receiver model has furthered our understanding of how complex 
organizational characteristics of MNEs, the characteristics of the knowledge transferred, and 
the knowledge-related characteristics of sending and receiving subunits as well as certain 
aspects of the technical and business environment enable and constrain knowledge flows in 
MNEs. However scant attention has been devoted to sub-organizational processes and the 
social context that constitute learning at micro-level and macro-level. Even though a number 
of contributions in the knowledge flow stream adopt the learning term (e.g. Zahra et al. 2000; 
Macharzina et al., 2001), saliently this literature continues to adopt a strictly ‘knowledge-
oriented’ perspective in which knowledge is treated as an invariant substance (Hong et al., 
2006b). As such, knowledge-oriented and cognitive perspectives largely neglect the 
transformational nature of transfer processes, their social constitution and their embeddedness 
in the wider institutional context. 
To address the inattentiveness to the transformational nature and the situatedness of 
learning, we seek to combine three bodies of theory. First, we draw on the social learning 
theory to unravel the social constitution of learning at the micro-level. Second, to better 
understand the transformational nature of social learning, we draw on Scandinavian 
institutionalism and draw on its concept of translation. Third, we draw on Whitley’s 
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comparative institutionalist approach to relate the organizational influences on learning to the 
complex national institutional embeddedness of learning processes in MNEs.  
 
Social learning perspectives 
Social or contextual learning perspectives centre on the idea that learning is constituted by 
actors that participate and interact in social processes (Elkjaer, 2005). In this view, learning is 
performed by collectives of participating actors – also understood as ‘communities of 
practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991) – that are embedded in specific social contexts. It involves 
actors who actively participate and communicate to construct meanings (Wenger, 1998). 
Learning in the social learning perspective not only sees participation as constitutional for 
learning but raises the question of who participates and why. This points to the relevance of 
organizational power structures and conflicts in learning processes. Elkjaer (2005: 45) argues 
that “the issue of empowerment [is] essential as learning requires access and opportunity to 
take part in the ongoing practice”. Thus, a focus on participation and its prerequisites turns 
our attention to power- and incentive-structures, trust and other factors that enable or 
constrain participation in different social contexts.  
This, in turn, underlines the importance of the situatedness of organizational learning 
(Cook and Brown, 1999) and the influence of various contexts to which learning is exposed 
(Gherardi, 2000). The contextual situatedness of learning also implies that practices 
transferred across organizational and societal divides rely on re-contextualization (Brannen, 
1999) or transformation (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000). It is this aspect that is particularly 
highlighted by Scandinavian institutionalism through “translation”. While social learning 
perspectives have explored micro-processes of learning and have emphasized the importance 
of organizational contexts, they have, so far, paid only scant attention to the complex 
institutional contextuality that affects organizational learning processes in MNEs. 
Specifically, how institutional contexts structure patterns of participation and interaction in 
organizations. As we will argue below, Whitley’s (2007) comparative institutionalist 
approach on organizational learning sheds light on this link.     
   
Scandinavian institutionalism  
Scandinavian institutionalism offers a fruitful discussion on learning in MNEs as it 
conceptualizes transfer processes across time and space and acknowledges its 
transformational nature. Its significant constructs of ‘editing’ and ‘translation’ help us define 
learning processes as sequences of translation rather than as ‘flows’ or ‘diffusion’ (Sahlin-
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Anderson, 1996; Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996). Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) argue that 
‘ideas’ can only be transferred if they are disembedded. This requires, as a first step, the 
translation of ‘ideas’ into ‘objects’ or ‘quasi-objects’ (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). 
‘Objects’ or ‘quasi-objects’ are semantic as well as physical artifacts such as texts or 
prototypes. However, to be organizationally meaningful and successfully integrated at the 
receiving end, objects or quasi-objects need to be translated into ‘action’. Only if an ‘action’ 
is repeated and stabilized is there a chance that the transference will rise above a passing 
fashion into an enduring institutional practice (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). In a similar 
vein, Sahlin-Anderson (1996) sees the transfer process as a ‘continuous editing process’, in 
which practices and organizational forms are generalized, circulated and re-edited depending 
on fluid situational and institutional conditions. The outcomes of such processes are new 
organizational forms and practices that combine ‘old and new, alien and local’. Sahlin-
Anderson (1996) underlines that the editing process is also a process of social control as 
different editing rules apply (depending on the institutional context) and only certain actors 
may participate as editors.  
Scandinavian institutional approaches offer a comprehensive understanding of 
learning as practices travel across organizational and national divides. They suggest that 
learning in the receiving context implies change in two directions. As actors seek to integrate 
an objectified practice into their social context, translation is required to tie the new practice 
into existing systems of meaning (cognition) and practices (behavior). In this process of 
integration or translation, both the translator’s cognitive and behavioural contexts and the 
translated practice itself change (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996). This notion is in alignment 
with Rottenburg’s (1996) argument that when an idea or ‘a thing’ is transferred to a new 
context, the idea as much as the context undergoes transition. Rottenburg (1996) stresses that 
only if actors tie new knowledge into their systems of meaning and then act upon it in a way 
that produces a new meaning or behavioural expression, can we say that integration has taken 
place. Within this view, both the transfer of practices into a new cognitive and behavioural 
system and the shift away from original meanings and actions through translation, are 
inherent features of learning.  
In contrast to the social learning perspective, contributions from Scandinavian 
institutionalism pay only passing attention to issues of power and empowerment that can 
influence the translation or transformation process (Becker-Ritterspach, 2006). Power and its 
foundations tend to be overlooked (Forssell and Jansson, 1996; Sevón, 1996), perceived as 
‘taken-for-granted political structures’ and ‘ideological control’ (Czarniawska and Joerges, 
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1996), ‘social control’ (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996), or understood as embedded in ‘dominant 
reality definitions’ (Rottenburg, 1996). A common feature of both social learning theory and 
Scandinavian institutionalism is that both fail to make explicit how different patterns of 
empowerment and participation, even if we accept that they are to a large degree taken-for-
granted and unquestioned, reflect different types of institutional contexts.  
 
Towards a social learning perspective in MNEs   
Drawing on Scandinavian institutionalism, we understand learning as socially embedded 
translation work. Practices transferred into a new organizational and societal context need to 
be translated to manifest as learning. This involves both a cognitive and a behavioural 
component. Practice transfer constitutes learning upon its cognitive and behavioural 
integration into the receiving context. This, in turn, means that the meanings and practices of 
what has been transferred as much as the pre-existing meanings and practices in the receiving 
context undergo change and take on new forms. In other words, the receiving unit and its 
actors change the transferred as much as the transferred changes the receiving context and its 
actors. However, from a social learning perspective, translation is not accomplished by 
atomized actors, but by social collectives that involve social actors that are differently 
empowered to participate by their organizational context (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Going 
beyond social learning theory and Scandinavian institutionalism we argue that such 
organizational conditions of participation are structured to a large degree by the national 
institutional context. We argue that such an understanding is particularly important in 
understanding learning processes in MNEs, as these firms’ units operate by definition in 
different national institutional context.   
To further our understanding of the institutional embeddedness of organizational 
learning, we draw on Whitley’s business system framework. Whitley (2007) conceptualizes 
the link between learning capability at the organizational level and national institutional 
differences by highlighting the effect of different patterns of authority sharing and 
organizational career on the learning capability of firms. The main line of reasoning is that 
firms require their employees’ commitment and competence (the improvement of employer-
specific knowledge and skills) for organizational learning activities. The employees’ 
commitment and competence is crucially related to the willingness of owners and managers to 
share authority and the longevity and functional specificity of organizational careers. Whitley 
(2007) argues further that the willingness of owners and managers to share authority with 
different groups and the nature of organisational careers is greatly affected by societal 
institutions, especially those governing trust relations and skill formation and control 
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(Whitley, 2007). In other words, organizational learning capabilities develop differently 
owing to variations in authority sharing and organizational careers that are connected to 
different institutional frameworks. Drawing on Whitley’s framework, we explore the extent to 
which we can relate different learning outcomes in the two subsidiaries under consideration to 
different patterns of authority sharing and organizational careers. Specifically, authority 
sharing “involves owners and top managers delegating considerable discretion over task 
performance – and sometimes task organization – to skilled employees, and encouraging them 
to contribute to product and process improvements” (Whitley, 2007:149). Whitley essentially 
argues that the higher the scope and degree of authority sharing, the greater the collective 
development of new skills, products and processes.  
Organizational careers is conceptualized as the extent to which firms are willing to 
provide long-term careers to key groups of employees to encourage them to contribute to the 
development of collective firm-specific competences through extensive collaboration within 
and across departmental boundaries. Whitley (2007) distinguishes here the scale and scope of 
staff covered by long-term careers as well as the functional specificity of organizational 
careers, particularly “how far up the formal hierarchy of managerial positions successful staff 
remain in the same broad functional field of expertise” (Whitley, 2007: 157). In simple terms, 
he suggests that the higher the scale and the scope of long-term careers, that is the more 
comprehensive the commitment to staff in the firm, and the less hierarchically and laterally 
confined, that is the less structural demarcations in the organization, the higher the collective 
learning potential within and across departments. In other words, commitment to staff and 
structural demarcation in terms of both hierarchical and lateral relations is expected to shape 
participation patterns. Combining Whitley’s comparative institutional approach with insights 
from social learning theory we expect to see differences in organizational authority sharing 
and organizational career (commitment to staff and structural demarcation) to manifest in 
different participation patterns and, hence, differences in learning outcomes.  
To sum up, our perspective on subsidiary learning aims to explore how learning, 
understood as the socially embedded translation work of actors, is organizationally constituted 
by different patterns of participation and if these patterns can be associated with different 
national institutional contexts. Hence, combining the social learning perspective with 
Scandinavian institutionalism and comparative institutionalism, we see subsidiary learning as 
translation work that is constituted by actors who participate in social processes (Elkjaer, 
2005) that are embedded in different host institutional contexts. 
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3. Research methodology and case introduction 
The research project on which this paper builds involved comparative case studies of learning 
in a Dutch MNE operating in Germany and the UK in the chemical industry. The study was 
part of a larger study that compared, based on theoretical replication, two MNEs with 
different strategies and four subsidiaries operating in contrasting institutional context (i.e. 
Germany representing the collaborative and the UK the compartmentalized form of 
governance) (Whitley, 1999). While the initial research project investigated the combined 
effect of MNEs organization model and a host institutional context on organizational learning 
in four subsidiaries operating in contrasting institutional context, this study’s aim was to 
understand in more detail why two of the subsidiaries of the same MNE, having similar 
characteristics in terms of transfer channel, transfer content, sending and receiving unit, 
reflected so markedly different learning patterns. Our interest was in highlighting the extent to 
which variation in learning patterns could be attributed to different subsidiary organizational 
conditions embedded in the wider national institutional context. We aimed to investigate the 
processes whereby continuous improvement in production was enacted by actors within a 
given local organizational context interacting with a wider institutional context of a country.  
The subsidiaries were selected on the basis of their contrasting learning patterns. The 
selection of the chemical industry of study was significant from the standpoint of high 
internationalization and innovativeness (see CEFIC, 2001). Thus, it lent itself to investigating 
cross-national incidents of learning. Both the British and the German MNE operated a flow-
production process.  
The study focused on the introduction of new procedures and systems in production 
that had behavioural consequences (Child, 1994), and in particular on the processes whereby 
continuous improvement in production was enacted by local actors. Learning was defined as 
the acquisition and enactment of these new practices by collective actors at subsidiaries. 
Learning patterns could vary based on the extent to which new practices were translated in the 
receiving context. This could either be extensive or limited. 
 While the institutional distance between the Netherlands and Germany may be 
perceived as smaller than that between the Netherlands and the UK, the difference in 
institutional distance is considered to be marginal (Hotho, 2009), hence it did not cause a 
difference in the way in which knowledge was transferred to the two subsidiaries. Both 
subsidiaries received the knowledge in much the same way, which did not appear reflective of 
any particular institutional context. More importantly, the transfer content largely consisted of 
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management practices which were already highly abstracted from their (mainly Japanese) 
institutional origins. 
The case study involved a total of 15 semi-structured formal interviews (2 in Dutch 
HQ, 4 in the UK and 7 in Germany), ranging from headquarter management down to site 
managers at different levels, carried out between July 2005 and August 2007. The field 
research at both subsidiaries comprised two daily visits plus a week-long participant 
observation. The latter provided ample opportunity for long informal conversations with 
shop-floor members (operators, team leaders and shift managers) during the work process as 
well as work breaks. In addition, company documents were analyzed. Company documents 
included, for example, strategic and mission plans, internal newsletters, documentation on 
operational procedures and performance as well as all kinds of shop floor displays. 
Information that was collected from documentation and respondents focussed on the strategic 
and operational goals underlying the continuous improvement initiatives, resources that were 
made available by headquarters, the manner in which changes were implemented, the extent 
to which the subsidiaries changed their practices and the degree to which the headquarters 
was involved in this process.  
The reliability of the findings was enhanced by making explicit the procedures that 
were followed for data collection. These procedures included matters of interview protocol, 
tape recordings of interviews and feedback on transcriptions or executive summaries from the 
participants. Interview data from a particular work group were checked against responses 
from another group to validate findings. Similarly, subsidiary and headquarter members’ 
accounts were cross-checked against each other. In addition, interview responses and contents 
of documentation were compared, where possible, and inconsistencies discussed with 
interviewees.  
Interview transcriptions were scanned to identify the extent to which practices were 
translated at subsidiary firms, as well as the organizational initiatives embedded in host 
institutional characteristics that were associated with the variation in translation. The case 
studies were combined with systematic comparison using Mill’s (1974) methods of agreement 
and difference. Detailed accounts ensured that context-boundedness of (the conditions 
underlying) a phenomenon of interest was elicited. A systematic comparison allowed for a 
significant theoretical leverage to make generalisation possible. The analysis required the 
elimination or the ‘successive exclusion of the various circumstance which are found to 
accompany a phenomenon in a given instance, in order to ascertain what are those among 
them which can be absent consistently with the existence of the phenomenon’ (ibid., p. 392). 
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This analysis contributed to the homogenization of construct definitions and measures to build 
mid-range theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Research Sites 
Dutch Chem (a pseudonym) is a Fortune Global 500 company employing 62,000 people 
globally and operating in more than 80 countries. The unit on which this study was based 
produced paints. Since 2000, the company had been standardizing and centralizing its 
organization to reduce costs.  
 
German Sub 
Like most subsidiaries in Dutch Chem, German Sub was acquired in 1998. German Sub 
introduced continuous improvement in 2004. German Sub hosted two different production 
departments—a wall paint and a lacquer plant—on its compound in Cologne. While there had 
been some investment, particularly in the lacquer plant, most of the manufacturing technology 
was old and inherited from the former owner. The workforce counted 411 and was severely 
reduced as part of HQ induced change initiatives. Since the introduction of continuous 
improvement, the production volume had been increasing.   
 
British Sub  
British Sub, acquired by Dutch Chem in 1994, introduced continuous improvement in 2003. 
The subsidiary manufactured both water-based and solvent-based paints. British Sub’s mostly 
old production technology had been taken over from the previous owner. Like German Sub, 
the work force had been reduced over time owing to HQ’s change initiative. At the time of 
research the workforce comprised around 324 people, down from 466 before the introduction 
of the change programme. This was paralleled by a decline in production volume. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
Dutch Chem’s change initiative 
With increasing pressure to reduce costs owing to increased competition in the industry, 
Dutch Chem introduced a continuous improvement programme called Star Trek at various 
sites in Europe in 2003. At the heart of the change initiative stood the effort to improve the 
operational performance of Dutch Chem’s different production sites. The required 
operational improvements included service level to customers, quality, cost per litre, stock 
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levels, and health, safety and environmental (HSE) issues (Star Trek Roadmap company 
document). Each site was informed of the need to achieve results in these five key areas. 
While the Star Trek suggested a range of practices (such as 5S, OEE, FROK, SMED, value 
stream mapping) to achieve the results, the sites were largely given the flexibility to decide 
on them (Supply Chain Europe Director). Rather than having to stick to and implement all 
defined practices, the sites were encouraged to select and translate them and to embed them 
in their own local visions of the Star Trek programme. This was also reflected in the 
specification of participation and empowerment as crucial ingredients for continuous 
improvement the Star Trek Roadmap.  
The overall vision for Production & Logistics [P&L] is to become a competitive 
weapon for Dutch Chem Europe. What does that mean for an individual site? It could 
mean exactly the same, but it could also be translated into a more local vision. The 
vision should motivate people to work on the realization of that vision, so it should be 
something that people can recognize, can handle and can translate into real actions. 
The vision must be of course in line with the overall P&L vision. (Star Trek Roadmap 
document) 
 
To summarize, Dutch Chem asked its subsidiaries to improve operational performance on a 
continuous basis. In Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) terms, the Star Trek Road Map 
provided the subsidiaries with a set of ‘objectified practices’ that broadly guided the 
implementation of continuous improvement in various subsidiaries.  
 
Learning processes at British and German Sub 
The research stays and interviews at the British and German Sub revealed substantially 
contrasting processes of organizational learning. German Sub was able to sustain 
improvement efforts with the high involvement of its shop floor workers and management. 
The site developed its own path to achieving the key measures through extensive translation. 
By contrast, British Sub faced challenges in sustaining improvement efforts. While German 
Sub was able to maintain an effective continuous improvement process that outlasted the end 
of the Star Trek programme and managerial change at the headquarters, the continuous 
improvement process at British Sub saw the “fizzling away [of Star Trek] over the last one 
and a half to two years” (Operator). “At first, the push from above is big, but then it withers 
over time because people are busy. The target has been to get the service level up to 99 per 
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cent, which has reduced the focus on other principles” (Manager of the blue shift, British 
Sub). 
 
Learning at the German site  
During the interviews and research stay it became clear that, in contrast to British Sub, 
German Sub had taken the freedom provided by HQ and had translated Star Trek into its own 
local vision, guiding principles and practices. This translation involved a departure from the 
original wording of Star Trek to a more locally focused slogan and image with which local 
employees could identify.  
I would say that Star Trek has no meaning for the people. I know that other sites did 
that differently but I, we very deliberately took the decision not to sell it under the 
label Star Trek. I would say it certainly was for us, as managers, a trigger. For me 
personally, I understood it as “there is finally some legitimation that what we want to 
do we can do with an official approval”. . For them [workers] this [Star Trek label] is 
much too far away. And you have to get the people’s attention and you cannot get 
their attention with something they don’t grasp or associate with. (Factory manager 
lacquer plant) 
 
At site management level Star Trek was translated into “Impossible is Nothing”.  In addition, 
to the general translation of Star Trek into a local vision and programme involving local site 
management, there was yet another step of translation that involved the participation of the 
local workforce. This involved deriving local guidelines from Star Trek together with the 
local work force. These guidelines were accompanied by the slogan “We from Cologne hand 
in hand”. The local workforce strongly identified with the slogans, accepted them as guiding 
principles and took pride in having had a role in formulating them.  
“The guidelines” are something you can fall back on. This is something the 
subordinate and the superior can refer to in any kind of discussion. And under each 
guideline there are a number of explanations that are understood by all. (Factory 
manager wall paint plant) 
 
These behavioral guidelines, in turn, were seen as a corner stone in realizing a new continuous 
improvement practices. They allowed moving away from a formal and cumbersome 
improvement system to sustained continuous improvement practices on a permanent basis. In 
fact, many examples of such continuous improvement practices were found during the 
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research stay. They included changed filling processes for acticides, eye shower installations, 
piping to reduce yeast and the development of a local system to track the service level 
(“Manko tracking”). Not only did the different improvements outlast the end of the Star Trek 
initiative, but the continuous improvement process proved sustainable even after the initiative 
had died down at corporate headquarters. While the guidelines formed a crucial element in 
accepting the need for continuous improvement, the wording of Star Trek or continuous 
improvement was deliberately avoided. This was also related to the fact that local workers had 
bad experiences with the consultancy firm that was involved in the early implementation 
phase, and with the formal improvement system at the site.  
Moreover, local management not only avoided taking on all practices suggested by Star Trek, 
but also the suggested manner in which they could be implemented:  
We call it S4S, I mean 5S is the standard understanding which was originally 
introduced by Toyota and zealously followed tralalal since, I mean all the way down 
to organizing your desk and defining a position for your pen. I am a big fan of 
imitation. Now, if someone had a good idea and we try to take that on board one-on-
one, this is not possible. Because each plant is different. I can get ideas somewhere 
else but then I have to see what fits best my system. (Production advisor lacquer plant) 
 
In contrast with the British site, standard operating procedures did not play a crucial role in 
the realization of continuous improvement at German Sub. These procedures were 
deliberately “not spelled out in all detail” (Production advisor wall paint plant). There was a 
lot of “experience knowledge” involved that was difficult to formulate (Production advisor 
wall paint plant). Moreover, workers were seen to differ in how they operated their machines, 
which also meant that using and defining in detail amounted to futile exercise.  
Overall, the aim was to create an improvement culture of learning that involved the entire 
organization. This implied that there was no particular project, practice or group of the 
workforce that was singled out to carry the improvement process. Rather, translation of the 
Star Trek program involved the participation of a wide range of different actors from across 
the organization, irrespective of hierarchical and functional divides.  
Authority sharing 
German Sub’s local production manager was a firm supporter of participative management 
and very much valued bottom-up input from the workforce.  
You have to accept that they know a hell of a lot. They know three times more than 
the stupid manager knows. He may know more about planning issues, but machine 
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knowledge and understanding the problems there the man in the line knows best. And 
one has to appreciate that.… if this is not the case we I have a problem.  (Factory 
manager wall paint plant) 
 
By the same token, his management team encouraged participation and subscribed to his 
‘people make the difference’-orientation. Overall, top and middle management displayed high 
trust in the local capability and felt the need to involve the work force.  
The main point is that you have to take the people into the boat. If you don’t do that 
you don’t even have to start. You have to be well integrated, you have to care about 
them, you have to listen to them, you have to talk to them and you have to give 
feedback be it positive or negative. One must not let this trickle into the sand. 
Otherwise motivation gets lost.  (Production advisor wall paint plant) 
 
Much more important than all those key words is that you take the people with you. 
That the people are inspired to create their own ideas. This imposition of certain things 
is in my view the wrong way. There are certain incentives to achieve certain basic 
systems. (Factory manager wall paint plant) 
 
Importantly, the local management style tried to replace a blaming, cover up and punishment 
culture, with a culture of setting incentives for good performance based on rewarding of 
bonuses to those who met performance targets and accepting the occurrence of mistakes. 
These, in turn, also encouraged participation in continuous improvement efforts.   
If production runs fail—costing about 30,000 to 40,000 Euros—workers are not 
punished any more. Instead they enter the office without hesitation and admit 
something has gone wrong. There is discussion as to why it occurred and how the 
same mistake can be avoided in the future…Earlier, workers would receive an official 
warning and some would even lose their jobs. (Production advisor, wall paint plant)  
 
In the German Sub, participation was also strongly driven by the local labour relations. The 
work between the works council and management was overall based on trust and cooperation. 
The works council played an active role in translating Star Trek initiatives into the local 
context. The works council was also involved in the design and redesign of the incentive 
system that went hand in hand with the integration of maintenance. 
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For example, in group work we started of with an agreement between ‘Betriebsrat’ and 
management (Betriebsvereinbarung). So this was worked out in the starting phase and 
the complete works council was involved. We discuss this among ourselves and then 
we approach the management with our suggestions. Of course they are often not 100% 
identical and so we try to find a compromise. That we most of the time always find. … 
Yes, it is not only about group work but also about the compensation system that goes 
with it. We articulate for example what kind of bonus we expect. (Chair works 
council) 
Organizational career – commitment to staff 
In the view of the German production management the Star Trek document put a wrong 
emphasis on connecting improvements with the laying-off of people. While lay-offs were also 
considered and took place, they were rather seen as a last resort. 
When it comes down to people, if you read his strategy paper or the road map, I am 
not sure in which paper it stands, then it says: the improvements mainly have to come 
from laying off people. …It is written in there. And I think he maybe means 
something different, but that’s what is written in there and I don’t think so. (Director 
of the German production site) 
 
In contrast to the British site, the ‘people make the difference orientation’ had even led to a 
departure from the path that had been introduced by the mandatory consultancy firm 
connected to the Star Trek program:  
We started this [continuous improvement] with a consultant named [X]. I was deeply 
impressed by the [X] people who more or less went with me through that first stage of 
change, changing process, changing the mindset. But they had one problem: [X] did 
not care about people. …When we started with [X], we were looking for results…But 
every time I went around in the factory, people were totally frustrated… When we 
went from one project to another, sustainability went away… In the last two years, we 
strongly focused on people’s behaviour and in creating a culture 
environment…Whatever we do, we try to focus on our people, on behaviour, on 
culture, on getting their passion…It is all about people at the end, and nothing else. 
(Director of the German production site) 
  
The works council also played a crucial role in management’s long-term commitment to 
employees. For example, it encouraged management to employ young apprentices upon the 
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completion of their training. At the same time, the German employment legislation protected 
the long-time employees assuring that the core capabilities or competences1 did not drain 
during repeated rounds of layoffs.  
He (talking about the production advisor wall paint plant) was on a specialist list and 
this has saved him from unemployment. But you cannot put all young people on a 
specialist list. Otherwise you end up with a huge specialist list. In simple terms, it was 
based on a point system on low down in the list was laid off. Thereby, we had to lay 
off qualified “Chemiekanten”, who made a good job in production with a clear growth 
potential. …But clearly the first layoffs where mainly governed by social criteria and 
in the last 2 to 3 years we are thinking more about changes, I mean about people who 
for whatever reason do not perform. This does not mean that they have to be laid off 
all the time. There may be as well other solutions. A case in point is a worker who 
cannot operate the AI aggregate for nervous system related problems. He will be 
shifted to another workplace… So it is a two step process, first the social plan and 
second thinking about expertise (Factory manager wall paint plant) 
 
While some sections of the workforce felt that the works council was too close to 
management, the overall effect had been one of trust building in the workforce because the 
management and the works council integrated each other’s interests and concerns as much as 
possible. The factory manager of wall paint commented in this context “we cannot complain”, 
adding that it is a relation of “giving and taking” (Factory manager of wall paint).2  
Importantly, apart from assuring work force motivation to participate in the continuous 
improvement, the commitment to staff insured that important improvement know-how stayed 
and reproduced in the company.  
 
Organizational career – structural demarcation 
Overall, there was a comprehensive interaction in the factory along vertical and horizontal 
lines in the structure. As regards vertical relations, some demarcation was reduced by 
devolving more responsibility to groups on the shop floor. Prior to the introduction of Star 
Trek, production groups were separated much more strictly into departments – there was “a 
                                                 
1 Most of the operators worked for the company for 20 to 30 years due to the incentives that repeated social plans 
offered for the recruitment of older, long-standing employees. In addition, many workers, particularly the group 
speakers, had gone through an apprenticeship finishing as “Chemiefacharbeiter qualification” (highly qualified 
workers).  
2 This attitude of mutual trust was also involved when we requested research access. Only after we introduced 
our project to the works council, and the works council approved our project, did management allow our 
research stay in the plant 
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wall” between different departments. What is more, earlier “Meisters” would oversee and 
hierarchically control these processes. With the introduction of Star Trek, control was 
completely devolved to the group which was often headed by a group speaker with a 
“Facharbeiter” qualification. While the role of the remaining “Meisters” had changed from a 
line to a more advisory and coordinating role, they still formed an important link between 
workers and middle management. In other words, there was a weak demarcation between 
workers, first-line and middle management which aided in instilling a continuous 
improvement culture:  
The plant is headed by the factory manager of wall paint. His right hand and link to the 
lines is a so called production advisor who worked himself up from the shop floor and 
is now a ‘Meister’. He strongly interacts with the group speakers of different 
departments…The group speakers [most of whom had an apprenticeship or trade 
training who were, under the old structure, known as foremen] have a very high 
acceptance with the workers. (Group speaker wall paint section, German Sub).  
 
As regards horizontal relations, the interaction pattern was also very smooth. The 
reorganization of the maintenance unit, and its integration into production were crucial in 
achieving this. For example, since the reorganisation, both the fitters and electricians were 
readily available and approachable as they also had to report to the factory managers. The 
reorganization not only reduced the hierarchy but also facilitated the integration of 
maintenance and production know-how.  
Yes, earlier it was called suggestions for improvement; today we simply call it an 
order for the workshop...Earlier, under the old workshop hierarchy, there was really a 
hierarchy. There we had the fat ‘Obermeister’ sitting at the top, and when he said now 
it is green; it was green, even if it was blue. That’s how it was. So people only had an 
opportunity to submit their suggestion through a third way called “Vorschlagswesen 
(Improvement system)” like maybe it is better if I change the hose of the pump every 
three months then I have fewer problems with the cleanliness. Now when the 
workshop hierarchy was broken up this changed. From then on, we had a workshop 
order list in excel where we could simply write down what we needed to get done and 
[X] checks this thing on a daily base and sees maybe consults [Y] if it is going to be 
too expensive or if extra resources are being provided…So the ideas of people are 
almost always tackled with or implemented within a very short period of time, without 
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having to make a big fuss. (Factory manager/Production advisor wall paint plant, 
German Sub) 
 
The rather low structural demarcation in vertical and horizontal terms had two effects on 
participation and, hence, on the implementation continuous improvement practice. In vertical 
terms, the low demarcation (and authority sharing) secured a fast decision making and 
implementation of bottom-up improvement ideas and, thereby, the continued commitment of 
the workers to participate in the improvement practice. In horizontal terms the low 
demarcation allowed the participation of actors with complementary know-how, enhancing 
the improvement competence.   
 
Learning at the British site  
In contrast to the German site, the British Sub showed few signs of translating Star Trek and 
sustaining continuous improvement. It had difficulties translating Star Trek into a local vision 
which was, for example, reflected in the local management’s critique of HQ for not providing 
firm guidance on changes to implement.  
This is more of a management issue where not enough or due attention has been 
given…Our improvement efforts are more or less a trial and error process. We need a 
firm strategy. There is a lot from headquarters that is relevant but we are asked further 
questions like ‘where do you see yourself in the future? What is your local vision? We 
do not know how these translate to the operational level. (Site manager) 
 
Overall, British Sub featured more of a top-down communication approach to implementing 
Star Trek. According to one shift manager, Star Trek was communicated to operators by 
“bombarding them with graphs and notice boards” (Shift manager, British Sub). In a similar 
vein, an operator with eight years of experience recalled: “the Star Trek program was 
communicated through leaflets and by a quick session upstairs. Majority has not been 
implemented” (Operator, British Sub). The low degree of local translation was also reflected 
in British Sub’s master plan to continuous improvement, which strongly focused on the 
measurement and improvement of operational indicators, rather than offering a framework 
linked to local identity to implement continuous improvement. The European improvement 
manager commented on British Sub in this context: 
There is no skeleton to the continuous improvement programme. It is like jelly. There 
is no structure. Hence, we need to address the capacity to improve. There is a model 
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for improvement that most people know now that involves measuring and analysing 
the opportunity, allocating resources (particularly people) and solving problems. 80 % 
of time is put into collecting data, with very little energy put into solving problems. 
Why would it, if resources are not deployed to this. It should be 20% data collection 
and analysis and 80% on resources and problem solving. (European Improvement 
Manager) 
 
In contrast to German Sub, middle and lower management at British Sub did not identify with 
the Star Trek program and were only marginally involved in translating it. By the same token, 
workers were not involved in the translation of the Star Trek programme into local guidelines 
in any collective goal-oriented way. The shop floor did not perceive it as its own, but rather as 
“a management thing” (Operator). During the interviews and the research stay, it became 
clear that only limited sections of the work force identified with the Star Trek programme and 
took on continuous improvement practices. The operators seemed largely ignorant of the Star 
Trek program. Most changes that had taken place in the – presumed – context of Star Trek 
affected only a small portion of the work force or production process; most operatives simply 
lacked an overview to notice these changes, or their consequences. 
For the most part, continuous improvements were expected to manifest in improved 
standard operating procedures and behaviour following improved procedures. As such, the 
improvement process relied on formalization and explication, in contrast with German Sub, 
where the standard operating procedures and their documentation played only a minor role in 
realizing continuous improvements. While a range of standard operating procedures were 
redefined, we found substantial discrepancy between formally defined procedures and actual 
behaviour. For example, a team leader commented that standard operating procedures are 
“brought in, people hear about it, but people tend to do it their own way”. According to him, 
people adapted or even ignored the standard operating procedures because “they can do it 
quicker”. He further explained that this followed from experience, and that people should only 
cut corners when it was safe, adding operators generally “do three quarters of” the standard 
operating procedures (Team leader, British Sub). 
While German Sub developed locally continuous improvement practices that outlasted 
the Star Trek initiative, the solutions developed British Sub failed to institutionalize. For 
example, the implementation of ‘5S’ areas was discontinued after the responsible consultancy 
firm and improvement manager left the site. Although one area of the ground floor had been 
successfully transformed following the ‘5S’ practice, the initiative was not put into a 
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sustained practice throughout the factory by shop floor workers. In the words of one 
operative: “if you spill there [the 5C area], you clean it up; but if you spill somewhere else, 
you just leave it”. 
Overall, there was also little effort to translate the Star Trek program to the local site 
or of involving the shop floor in its translation. Those continuous improvement practices 
chosen for application, such as 5S or value stream mapping, largely reflected the suggestion 
of the Star Trek Road Map and showed little signs of having been openly and deliberately 
translated to the local context by means of local participation. Instead, quite a number of 
modules such as 5S were offered to operators in classroom training, owing to the level of 
subsidies offered by the UK government to minimize the loss of manufacturing jobs. To a 
large extent, improvement processes were allocated to so-called process improvement groups 
(PIGs) or projects rather than perceived as a collective endeavour involving the entire 
organization on a constant basis. One operator told us, for instance, that she had never 
participated in a PIG, and had seen no changes coming from them. She stated that changes 
should have gone “all the way, not just parts” adding that it “has to be factory wide“ 
(Operator). 
Authority sharing 
In contrast to German Sub, there were few signs of authority sharing. Participation in 
continuous improvement was not supported by a motivating incentive system at British Sub. 
Rather “continuous improvement has also meant loss in shift payments. This was a big 
concern for the operators” (Site manager). At the same time, there was recognition on the part 
of the senior site management that change in management involving a “better mix of people” 
and more “people managers” was required (Site manager for the UK). Particularly, middle 
management was identified as hampering the introduction of continuous improvements 
through lack of participation and leadership: 
I am very hands-on, but I also work at a strategic level. In order to get managers like 
[X] out of their comfort zone, you need to create an environment that is challenging 
for them. It is by far more rewarding and effective to change the motivation of the 
majority of people who are mainly on the shop floor, then help managers to be able to 
deal with this and support it. You create a pull (bottom-up) versus a push (top-down) 
[change].…They are very traditional, political animals, not normally very good 
listeners. (European Improvement Manager) 
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Similarly, a team leader commented that management was not listening: “That’s a straight 
no”.  Work experience on the shop floor also pointed to “a blame culture”: 
Higher management should have an independent position when supervisors have 
problems with an operative. They often unconditionally side with the supervisors. It is 
the old [previous owner of the site] mentality…Lower management seems to support 
some sort of divide and conquer style…There is a blame culture. (Operator) 
 
On the shop floor, in turn, there was much complaint that management did not respond to 
operators’ inputs. An operator in pre-labelling, who worked at the site for 20 years, expressed 
his frustration with the attitude of management:  
They have to work on the communication between different sections, shifts, and 
between the shop-floor and management, which should be clearer.… Requests should 
be followed up quicker, and management should believe what operatives are saying. 
This has not improved. There are personality clashes between lower management and 
the shop floor. There is a way to be asked and a way not to be asked (Operator).  
 
Overall, lower and middle management seemed to prefer to be distant from and not associated 
with shop floor activities. There was only limited respect and understanding of shop floor and 
in-house capability. This was also reflected in the strong reliance on external consultants and 
training. It contrasted sharply with German Sub, where the site manager had graduated from 
the ranks of workers, took pride in his production know-how and appreciated shop-floor 
insight. 
In a similar vein, British Sub’s labour representation at the company level played 
much less of a proactive role. The UK master plan for continuous improvement stated in this 
respect: “Unions are not yet in the boat: ‘what’s in it for me?’”. While the unions supported 
external training of the workforce, there was no indication that they played an active part in 
translating and shaping the continuous improvement organization associated with the Star 
Trek program.  
The unions who are still quite strong in this country, they of course cannot oppose 
those kinds of steps in continuous improvement. They see as well that the people who 
vote for them, they actually like doing this. (Operations director) 
Organizational career – commitment to staff 
With regard to reducing labour, the British management had fewer concerns and found it 
much easier to reduce its head count. This condition may have worked against finding more 
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employment-securing solutions in realizing cost reductions connected to continuous 
improvement. Put differently, in a scenario where lay-offs are comparatively easy, improving 
performance by reducing head count may be the first and not the last resort. This in turn puts 
additional strain on continuous improvement processes that are organized into projects.   
 
On the other side, we have had a restructuring here. We have taken out 60 jobs. It was 
not difficult to get volunteers. ‘If you have a redundancy program here, I will 
volunteer’. In the Netherlands, it will never happen. They will fight until the end, until 
the judge decides. The same in Germany. You will never get rid of people in a way 
like that. (Operations director) 
 
[X] takes a lot of effort to explain to me that there has always been a conflict between 
the implementation of continuous improvement and delivering the results. [X] 
explains that costs went down across Europe, and that that internally put a lot of 
pressure on cost saving. The focus had been on “head count”, and though no people 
were actually laid off, the natural erosion of people through retirement, changing jobs, 
and even through death, had led to a reduction in work force which was not 
replenished. Consecutively, resources (man-power) had been so tight that they simply 
had insufficient resources to free up operatives for additional training etc. [X] says that 
therefore, it’s a chicken and the egg story. (Site manager) 
 
In short, the strong emphasis on reducing head count in British Sub had the effect that the 
remaining employees found little time to participate and contribute to improvement activities.  
 
Organizational career – structural demarcation 
Management and shop floor interaction at British Sub was marked by a high social and 
professional demarcation and mutual opposition. The strong demarcation between middle/first 
line management and the shop floor hindered the sustainability of continuous improvement 
efforts:  
The Star Trek principles are broadly based on a philosophy of continuous 
improvement which means involving people, building in quality, clear target setting, 
JIT, and eliminating waste. Easier said than done. Even today this is not clear, or if it 
is, it is certainly not delivered. Either principles have not been translated into shop 
floor objectives or there is a fear factor at first-line and middle management levels. 
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This is the biggest blockage. There is cherry-picking of practices with which they feel 
comfortable, and then a period of waiting. I have been going to the shop floor. Once 
you engage them, they will turn the business around. They have to challenge the status 
quo. They have technical, traditional management backgrounds. Continuous 
improvement way of working means working close with people. There needs to be a 
shift from ‘telling’ to ‘inquiring’. (European Improvement Manager) 
 
While there was the realization of a need for an organizational change to facilitate the 
continuous improvement process, little change had taken place. Operators found, for example, 
that at least one management layer should be removed as there were “too many cowboys, not 
enough Indians” (Operator). 
As at German Sub, group work had been introduced at British Sub as part of the 
continuous improvement practices suggested by Star Trek. Although this introduction would 
have been expected to change some of the problems in management-worker relations, 
communication problems persisted. The ineffectiveness of organizational change was largely 
rooted in the continuation of a hands-off management marked by strong socio-professional 
demarcations between lower/middle management and workers. At the same time, there was 
some change with regard to the functional demarcations. In this regard there was “setting up 
of cross-functional improvement groups with the involvement of those people who are keen 
on continuous improvement” (Site manager). 
 However, it was the project-based nature of these “cross-functional improvement 
groups” or “process improvement groups” (PIGs) that strongly accounted for the limited 
translation at British Sub. While these PIGs removed, to some degree, functional demarcation, 
their success was limited. On the one hand, they involved a limited section of the 
organization. As a result, those not involved found it difficult to relate to the improvements 
suggested by PIGs.  On the other hand, PIGs were particularly vulnerable to time and resource 
shortage because they were not part of day-to-day working activity. They were vulnerable to 
time and human resource shortages: “The PIGs died before they started. Not because they 
didn’t want it, but because they have been understaffed for a long time. There simply is no 
chance to get together“ (Operator, British Sub). A shift manager indicated that PIGs had been 
in decline as service levels went down and all hands were needed at the machines. As a result, 
resources that were deemed necessary for the implementation of Star Trek could not be freed 
up.  
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In addition to the internal compartmentalization and temporary nature of improvement 
projects, there was also much externalization in facilitating continuous improvement by 
making extensive use of external consultants and training facilities. Both the hierarchical 
demarcations in the organization and the demarcation between those who were involved in 
projects and those who were not, led to internal organizational divides that reduced the 
motivation and the capacity for realizing continuous improvement throughout the 
organization. At the same time, the unions were also not too supportive of efforts to reduce 
professional divides through the introduction of multi-skilling, which was a requirement for 
the implementation of group work. 
The skills level of the workforce can be more up-to-date. Multi-skilling is widespread 
only in the warehouse, across electrical and mechanical skills. Skills can be upgraded. 
However, the workers need to have the right opportunity. They appreciate investment 
in skills. (Task rotation is favoured by some employees). Trade unions are against 
multi-skilling, because earnings are designed around one skill. Hence there is an 
impact on earnings. (Site manager) 
 
Union membership also appeared to go hand in hand with the demarcation between the shop 
floor and first line managers and middle management.  
 
Trade unionism started here. The team leaders are union representatives. There is still 
a line of demarcation between management and operators.  (Site manager for the UK) 
 
In contrast to German Sub, there were functional and substantial hierarchical demarcations 
between different members of the organization at British Sub. These demarcations played an 
important role in explaining low levels of participation and in turn limited translation of 
improvement practices at British Sub. 
 
5. Discussion: The institutional embeddedness of learning  
Prior to the implementation of Star Trek, both the German and the British sites faced similar 
pressure to implement continuous improvement to change their operational performance. Yet 
the sites differed markedly in how they dealt with this pressure and consequently with regard 
to their learning patterns. While German Sub displayed extensive translation and a high 
institutionalization of continuous improvement across different organizational levels, British 
Sub showed limited translation and a lower level of institutionalization. A corner stone of the 
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difference rested on the participation patterns in the two subsidiaries. In German Sub the high 
levels of participation was based on a high managerial commitment towards authority sharing 
and a low vertical and horizontal demarcation in the organization. The latter was largely 
facilitated by the structural integration of production and maintenance and by the introduction 
of an integrating incentive system. In addition, the local works council participated and played 
a very proactive role.  
In British Sub the low levels of participation rested on low authority sharing and high 
levels of vertical and horizontal demarcation. Also, contrasting with German Sub, the local 
unions played only a passive role and did not participate much in the translation of the Star 
Trek. The limited internal participation at British Sub was also enforced by the heavy reliance 
on external trainers and consultants. This contrasted with the German case, where the 
participation of external actors was rather low (see Table 1).  
 
- Insert table 1 about here- 
 
The different organizational conditions observed in German and British Sub can only be fully 
understood in the light of their embeddedness in the wider institutional context of Germany 
and Britain. While organizational idiosyncrasies play an important role which cannot be 
equated with a mere reflection of institutional conditions, it is important to see how they are 
intertwined with the wider institutional context. Below, we outline how the differences 
observed in terms of authority sharing and organizational career may be related to the 
institutional context.   
Whitley categorizes the UK as managerially coordinated with limited internal 
authority sharing and organizational career perspectives to skilled staff. Germany, in contrast, 
is classified as a cooperative hierarchy with extended internal authority sharing and 
organizational career prospects to skilled staff. In terms of collective learning ability this 
implies that while learning in managerially coordinated firms is generally restricted to the 
managerial hierarchy, learning in cooperative hierarchies occurs on a much broader scale as it 
rests on the contributions of all long-term employees which crucially involves skilled workers 
(Whitley, 2007).   
Whitley argues that these different learning capabilities rest on different kinds of 
authority sharing and organizational careers, which are connected to different institutional 
frameworks. These are defined by different political, financial, labour market and skill 
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formation systems. In the following discussion we will focus on the latter as we see these as 
crucial to understanding variation in participation patterns in our cases. 
 
Institutional Roots of Authority sharing 
In line with Whitley’s framework, we find a stronger collective learning capability at the 
German Sub compared to British Sub. We also find that this is crucially related to different 
participation patterns, involving a strong continuous improvement process in German Sub that 
rests on a strong commitment of skilled workers. In contrast to this learning mode, we find a 
rather temporally and spatially restricted learning process in British Sub that hardly builds on 
the involvement of skilled workers.  
Societal roots of these differences rest among other factors in different skill formation 
systems and industrial relations system (Whitley, 2007, see also Delmestri and Walgenbach 
2005). For example, the British context has a highly compartmentalized skill formation 
system that very much rest on professional demarcations. In addition, there is more emphasis 
on generic skills across firms coupled with weak internal labour markets. Taken together, 
generic skills, professional demarcation and low commitment to firm-specific careers limit the 
willingness to share authority (Whitley, 2007). This is different in more integrated and less 
compartmentalized skill formation systems (involving employers, unions and state agencies) 
that are coupled with stronger internal labour markets, like that in Germany.  
For instance, a key feature of the German skill formation system is its technical craft 
orientation and its continuous nature, creating strong cross-hierarchical occupational identities 
and allowing for “the possibility of moving vertically between different educational 
programmes and levels” (Sorge, 1995: 255). In our case this was also reflected in the 
backgrounds of German Sub employees. For example, the German Sub director started as a 
worker and moved into the director position through a continuous path of skills development. 
The long-termist approach is complemented by a highly developed system of vocational 
education and training creating a technically competent and flexible workforce (Ferner et al., 
2001). Managers—in particular first line and middle managers—graduate from the shop floor 
level and speak the same technical language. In this context, the “Meister” constitutes, in 
particular, an important professional category as he forms a smooth link between management 
and the shop floor (e.g. Becker-Ritterspach, 2005). The continuous nature, the vertical 
mobility and technical craft orientation of skills development encourages vertical participation 
(cf. Delmestri and Walgenbach 2005).  
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In the UK, by contrast, there are fewer opportunities for continuous advancement and 
exposure to combined practical and academic training in the higher education system (Lane, 
1997). Not only is the system highly compartmentalized and diverse (e.g. Whitley, 1999), 
there is also a strong decoupling of practical and academic knowledge. Management careers 
are more generalist in nature and focused to a greater degree on learning through experience 
than formal qualifications (Tregaskis et al., 2001; Delmestri and Walgenbach, 2005). In fact, 
“[t]he stronger the link between academic knowledge and practical experience, the less 
prestigious the educational programme” (Sorge, 1995: 257). Moreover, technical programmes 
are generally rated inferior to academic programmes. As a result, British managers tend to be 
“generalists and their approach to management is more likely to be generally administrative 
and financial than technical” (ibid., p. 251). There is a strong separation of strategic and 
operational management and the exercise of control via financial mechanisms (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). This is not surprising given that managers typically receive education in 
‘general’ management with a strong emphasis on finance (ibid.). Managers are also seen to 
have “little understanding of individual professional fields and [as] not possess[ing] the 
necessary competence required in each area” (Sorge, 1995). Similarly, Delmestri and 
Walgenbach (2005:198) argue that “Italian and German middle managers are more involved 
in knowledge work activities (e.g. technical problem solving) than British ones, who restrict 
themselves to ‘management’”. Both the compartmentalization of the education system and the 
decoupling of practical/technical and academic know how in the British education system 
may explain the strong socio-professional distance across different organizational levels. This 
education-system based distance not only restricts the vertical mobility but also implies that 
different employee categories in the organizational hierarchy have different professional 
identities and speak different professional languages reducing the conditions for effective 
participation in vertical and lateral terms.  
However, different patterns of participation are also related to differences in the 
German and British industrial relations and their regulatory frameworks (see also Whtiley, 
2007). A typical feature of the German industrial relation system is the strong element of 
cooperation between the works councils and management. This becomes possible because 
part of labour conflict – such a wage bargaining – is externalized to higher-level negotiations 
and collective agreements between employer and employee associations. At the German Sub, 
the conspicuous smooth management-works council interaction was very much reflective of 
the traditional German institutional framework. It was this participative behaviour and spirit 
of mutual trust that allowed German Sub’s works council to play a proactive role.  
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In contrast to German Sub, we found a more passive role on the part of the local 
unions who were sceptical of multi-skilling efforts at the British Sub. The passive role may be 
related to the high importance of professional demarcations in the organization of unions in 
the UK, often involving different unions at a site. In other words, various unions represent 
different sections of the workforce, which reinforces socio-professional demarcation (Sorge, 
1995). In contrast to Germany, industry-level collective agreements tend to be insignificant, 
leaving the settlement of most important aspects of the employment relationship to company 
level negotiations (Sorge, 1995). This, in turn, bears the potential for higher conflict levels 
and lower participation in the union-management relationship and lower trust and 
cooperation.   
Dutch Chem granted its UK and German sites high operational flexibility, as well as 
left them less supported, whereby a local subsidiary could, based on its own initiatives, 
change its work systems. For instance, the German site of Dutch Chem emphasized and 
sustained change in mindsets through an integrated ‘dual approach’, where collective 
arrangements and high involvement systems form a partnership (see Tüselmann et al., 2006). 
In other words, the highly regulated and strongly institutionalized industrial relations context 
of Germany required an approach that addressed the local institutional pressure of a 
collectivist system as well as responded to competitive pressures to improve quality and 
minimize cost. This was achieved at the German site by implementing collective and direct 
employee involvement schemes. The former included representation of works council 
members’ interests in continuous improvement changes through their participation in 
alternative work practices (also see Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005), and the latter 
involved direct participation in practices, information sharing and consultation that were 
focused at the level of the individual employee.  
By contrast, there was no ownership of continuous improvement practices at the UK 
site of Dutch Chem owing, in part, to the adoption of a ‘low road’ minimalist approach, i.e. 
the absence of high involvement system (evidenced by the hands-off approach to 
management) and of collective arrangements. It is quite common in deregulated industrial 
relations settings such as the UK to have predominantly individualistic employee relations 
patterns, which may take either the ‘high road’ individualized direct involvement approach, 
where there is direct employee participation but no collective arrangements, or  ‘low road’ 
minimalist approach where there is neither direct employee participation nor collective 
arrangements (Tüselmann et al., 2006). Guest and Conway (1999) argue that in ‘black-hole’ 
organizations, where there is neither a set of progressive HRM practices nor a recognized 
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union, there is more negative attitude and work experience than in cases where one or the 
other or both exist(s). 
 
Organizational careers 
Organization-wide participation and thus collective learning capability is strongly enabled and 
constrained by organizational career patterns. In this, respect Whitley (2007) emphasises the 
scale and scope of staff covered by long-term careers as well as the functional specificity of 
organizational careers. As in the case of authority sharing, Germany and the UK differ 
markedly in this respect. While in managerially coordinated firms, like the UK, the 
commitment to and the range of employees covered by organizational careers is mainly 
limited to managers and senior experts, cooperative hierarchies have a considerably wider 
scope, including skilled workers. In the latter the functional specificity is also much more 
pronounced and reaches up into senior management. This implies again that learning in 
managerially coordinated firms is limited to the managerial hierarchy. In this context Whitley 
argues: 
Companies where these career types dominate are able to generate strong coordinating 
abilities, particularly of different functions and expertise, but they tend to be less 
effective in learning how to implement continuous improvements to work processes, 
especially when that involves skilled labour force. (Whitley, 2007: 160) 
 
This may also explain, why the management relied more on external actors and expertise to 
support the learning process at British Sub. In cooperative hierarchies, in contrast, learning 
across vertical divides is much more common.  
Functionally specialized careers extend further down organizational hierarchies to 
encompass many skilled employees, and so encourage widespread commitment to 
joint problem solving and organization-specific knowledge development. (Whitley, 
2007: 160) 
 
However, while continuous improvement capability is considerable here, Whitley (2007) 
emphasises that it is strong within functional departments and much less across functional 
divides. This would also explain why management in German Sub was eager to reduce 
functional barriers by integrating maintenance and production, which was seen as the main 
stumbling block to learning.  
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The skill formation system, industrial relations and labour market system play a strong 
role in explaining differences in organizational careers and in lateral and vertical 
demarcations. For example, the vertical demarcation between workers and management has, 
traditionally, not been very pronounced in Germany. Sorge (1995) found that “the 
organizational division into separate units, jobs and hierarchical levels [in Germany] was 
much less extensive than in France and Great Britain” (Sorge, 1995: 250). Here again, the 
long-term commitment to all kinds of skilled staff and on skills development combined with a 
strong technical craft orientation create similar occupational identities among employees of 
different levels in the organization (cf. Whitley, 2007).  
By contrast, the UK identifies with a ‘Taylorist’ work system that combines high 
levels of job fragmentation and strong manager-worker separation (Whitley, 1999). Sorge 
adds that “[n]owhere else is the difference between managers (line) and specialists (staff), 
between hierarchical authority and expertise sharper than here [UK]” and adds that 
“[d]epartments, task groups, jobs and professions are more sharply delineated” (Sorge, 1995: 
251). In addition, employees in the maintenance division, specialist staff positions and in 
upper management have much more professional autonomy and a higher status than 
employees directly involved in production (Sorge, 1995). These vertical and horizontal 
demarcations are again rooted in the compartmentalization and decoupling of academic and 
technical/practical knowledge in the British system. Unlike in Germany where the diffusion of 
high-level scientific and technical education in the Technische Hochschulen from mid-century 
and the network of Ingenieurschulen for more practical skills created in the 1890s a 
competitive edge in particularly chemicals, metals, and electrical and heavy machinery, the 
inheritors of these enterprises in Britain are less likely to have a thorough technical training 
(Dore et al., 1999). The features of the British education system suggest reasons as to why 
British Sub implemented continuous improvement in the form of a temporary project. The 
project groups served only to bridge high horizontal and vertical demarcations on a temporary 
base. Moreover, the stronger reliance of British Sub on external training of its work force 
reflects the UK’s strong reliance on formal qualifications and off-the-job skills development 
(Boisot, 1995). While German Sub was also shifting towards using more and more unskilled 
temporary workers, it still had a high rate (70 per cent Chemiefacharbeier/Chemical Crafts 
Worker) of workers that had undergone apprenticeship training. Thus, the stronger reliance of 
British Sub on external training programmes served as the means to compensate for skills 
deficiencies, which are seen as relatively common in the British institutional setting (Lane, 
1996).  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper highlighted the two core weaknesses that dominate the current debate on learning 
in MNEs. These are the inattentiveness to the transformational nature of knowledge, and the 
limited attention given to social constitution of learning at the organizational level and its 
embeddedness in the wider national institutional context.  
In comparing the case of a German and British subsidiary of a Dutch multinational, we 
tried to show that learning is intimately connected to translation. As the German case showed, 
the institutionalization of the new practices meant that local actors needed to translate these 
practices into their own language, meanings and practices to identify with them and render 
them their own. Paradoxically, this meant that successful transfer went hand-in-hand with the 
transformation of the transfer content, i.e. transformation beyond recognition of original 
meanings and practices. As a result of the successful implementation, both the transfer content 
as well as the receiving context of meaning and practice transformed into something novel.  
We showed that these different translation patterns relied on the participation of local 
actors and that the translation of practices remained limited when only certain actors were 
empowered and able to participate. Hence, a closer look at organizational level conditions 
may be crucial to understanding how translation is enabled or constrained. Specifically, we 
suggested that organisational conditions which facilitate the participation in translation work 
of a wide range of actors, such as authority sharing and limited structural demarcations 
strongly influence the translation of continuous improvement ideas into institutionalized 
practices. Furthermore, we highlighted the embeddedness of participation patterns in the 
wider national institutional context. Here, we showed that skill formation and industrial 
relations systems of the host context enhanced our understanding of the variation in the 
sustainability of new practices. We suggested that the difference in participation pattern can 
be associated with different degrees of compartmentalization/continuity and the valuation of 
the practical/technical knowledge in different institutional systems.  
These findings support the contributions of comparative institutionalists who have 
argued for diversity in practices owing to the constraining effects of home and/or host 
institutional contexts (e.g. Almond et al., 2005; Ferner et al., 2005). Furthermore the study 
suggest that more attention needs to be paid in the context of IB to the extent that different 
institutional contexts enable and constrain organizational learning by allowing social actors to 
participate and interact to different degrees. That said, to assume that the actions of local 
actors are strictly the product of structural and institutional factors would be overly 
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deterministic (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2008). Clearly, agency matters, as does the actual 
extent of institutional embeddedness (Geppert and Williams, 2006). Hence, future research 
should also examine the extent to which the translation of practices depends on the power and 
motives of local actors. 
Moreover, accounts of learning in international settings that recognize the link 
between transferred practice and action in institutionalizing it require more empirical 
research, particularly given the emphasis on international diversity as a significant 
determinant of learning within MNEs (Zahra et al., 2000). Future research, in an effort to 
strengthen our findings, can shed light on the interactive and contentious nature of learning in 
other forms of national governance as well as in settings undergoing institutional change. This 
would address some of the failings in mainstream international business scholarship, as 
outlined by Redding (2005), in particular the privileging of context-free rational agency and 
the determinacy over subtle and less explored influences of history, context and social 
meaning systems. 
We recognize two important limitations of our work. The first concerns, the potential 
attribution difficulty with regard to organizational conditions that are firm-specific 
idiosyncrasies and those that are reflective of the wider institutional context. While our 
findings suggest that many of the differences found in organizational conditions reflect the 
respective institutional context, there were also organization idiosyncrasies at work. For 
example, the reduction of functional demarcations (integrating production and maintenance 
and introducing an incentive system) by German Sub’s management may be only partly 
attributable to institutional background. To disentangle these organizational effects from 
institutional effects would involve a wider comparative study that compared more subsidiaries 
in the same institutional context.  
The second limitation concerns the assumption that Germany is a collaborative 
business system (Whitley, 1999) or, as labeled by Hall and Soskice (2001), a coordinated 
market economy. We recognize that while some scholars find this classification still highly 
useful (e.g. Hall and Gingerich, 2004), it has been called in to question by others. For 
example, Lane (2005) argues that the German market economy is converging towards a more 
liberal type of market economy. Similarly, Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007) argue 
Germany’s labour market policies saw a substantial shift towards a ‘liberal welfare state 
approach’. While we do not wish to deny that such shifts haven taken place in certain 
institutional domains of the German economy, we side with contributions that emphasize a 
differentiated perspective and see the need for a “more nuanced analysis of what might be 
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described as non-trivial movement within the broad categories of ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ 
market economies” (Hall and Thelen, 2009, p. 25). Also calling for a more fine-grained 
perspective, Allen (2004) argues that the comparative institutional literature wrongly assumes 
institutions “to be uniformly spread across firms within a national economy” (p. 87). 
Interestingly, even Lane (2005) does not deny differences among sectors and firms and admits 
that many features of the old system of corporate governance persist (see also Almond et al. 
2003). Such views suggest, on the one hand, that there maybe continuity because or despite of 
change and on the other that there may be more variety within business systems across firms 
and industries than the reified ideal types suggest. With regard to empirical research, this calls 
for a careful use of the ideal types, asking to what extent they apply to a firm operating in a 
particular industry in a particular country.  
In our case we did see typical features of the ‘German Model’ at work. This was 
particularly the case because the workforce at German Sub was rather old and was for the 
most part professionally socialized before the 1990s. It was also the case, because central 
components of the German vocational training system were still in place in the company. 
While German sub was increasingly operating with temporary workers to buffer variation in 
production levels, it still held on to its apprentice training system. In spite of the liberalization 
of labour market policies in Germany, employment security for the long standing workforce 
has not changed much in recent years (see also Harcourt et al., 2006). Although comparative 
institutionalists have recently argued that the dual system of employee representation has 
eroded (Hassel, 2002, Lane 2005), our findings did not point to such a development for the 
core workforce in our case. This is not to deny that we saw an increased dualism (core vs. 
temporary) of the workforce (Carlin and Soskice, 2009). However, this dualism did not 
interfere much with those elements of the ‘old’ German Model (vocational training, authority 
sharing, low demarcation, participative labour relations) that were conducive to learning 
efforts at the German Sub.           
In terms of practical implications, first, our findings highlight that in order for the 
transfer of new practices to be successful, it is essential to actively involve local actors. The 
successful institutionalization of new practices, where local actors eventually accept new 
practices and perceive them as their own, rests heavily on the extent to which new practices 
are translated to the local language and to local meaning systems. This demands active 
participation of the actors involved. Local actors should therefore be actively encouraged and 
enabled to participate in the translation of new practices, even though this may paradoxically 
lead to significant changes of the original transfer content. Second, our findings imply that the 
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successful transfer of practices requires organizational conditions that facilitate the active 
participation in translation work. In particular, the participation of local actors in translation 
work benefits both from authority sharing and relatively low levels of structural demarcation. 
Here lies a key challenge for MNEs. Different host countries may differ markedly in the 
extent to which the local institutional context encourages authority sharing and long-term 
organizational careers. In institutional host contexts where enabling institutional conditions 
such as relatively integrated skill formation systems are absent, a more consciously ‘high 
road’ (Tüselmann et al., 2006) or direct involvement approach to employee relations may be 
necessary in order to ensure employee participation in learning activities. 
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Table 1: Different learning patterns and their organizational constitution 
 German Sub British Sub 
Learning pattern Extensive translation across 
different organizational levels  
Limited translation across different 
organizational levels  
 
Participation 
pattern 
Extensive participation across the 
hierarchical range 
Participation limited to 
management and external 
consultants 
Organizational 
conditions 
High authority sharing; 
High commitment to and of staff; 
Low horizontal and vertical 
demarcation 
Low authority sharing; 
Low commitment to and of staff; 
High horizontal and vertical 
demarcation 
 
 
